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Abstract:  Do commodity  price  shocks  have  heterogeneous  effect  on  countries
based on their  export and import profiles?  I  address  this  question  through a
panel  study  of  142  countries  using  Export  and  Import  Indexes  aimed  at
differentiating the retail pass-through and fiscal balance channel of  transmission
of  Commodity Price shocks on inflation.  The results show that an increase in the
Export Index leads to a decrease in contemporary inflation while an increase in
the Import Index leads to an increase in inflation in the next year. Average causal
mediating effect of  the Export Index on Inflation through the Fiscal Balance was
shown to be negative.*  
I would like to thank Professors Man Chiu (Sunny) Wong and Jacques Artus for their guidance and 
mentorship in this research project. 
*Case study of  Chile and its copper exports is in the Appendix. 
1. Introduction
Inflation plays a big role in the lives of  the poor around the world. The poor have 
limited access to banking services, this leaves them unable to offset their losses to inflation. 
Beck (2007) has found that people in the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have significantly 
lower access to banking services than people in Developed Countries. The recent episode of  
hyperinflation in Zimbabwe ,as analyzed by Coomer (2011), is the most outrageous example of  
government mismanagement of  the money supply. Wines (2006) reports anecdotal evidence of  
negative impacts on the residents of  Zimbabwe. However one does not have to experience 
hyperinflation to incur losses to welfare from inflation. Fujii (2013) found evidence that the poor
are especially vulnerable to inflation and especially food inflation. Easterly (2001) found in an 
extensive survey that the poor name inflation as their top economic concern. Cardoso (1992) 
argues that the poor in Latin American countries are not affected by inflation because their cash
holdings are too small. 
In 2011 atleast 25 countries in the world experience double digit inflation according to 
the World Bank and all of  those countries are in the Developing World. This causes the poor to
lose purchasing power or change their purchasing decisions to offset inflation. The poor, in the 
absence of  banking services, may choose to buy consumer durables to offset inflation. Even this
move will still net them a loss in welfare as the consumer durable good earns a negative return 
equal to its depreciation. Easterly (2001) found that inflation reduced the real wage of  the poor 
and states that inflation is a “cruel tax” on the poor. 
The earliest look at inflation was done by Phillips (1958) who found a relationship 
between inflation and unemployment in the United States between 1861 and 1958. This finding
was embraced by the Keynesian economists of  the early half  of  the 20th century. However the 
hyperinflation of  the 1970s in the United States and the complete breakdown of  the Phillips 
curve in empirical testing after 1960s opened the door for the Quantity Theory of  Money. Gali 
(1999) and other economists are still trying to revive the idea of  the Phillips curve. 
The dominant theory on inflation today considers it as purely a monetary phenomenon. 
This theory is based on the Quantity Theory of  Money and was brought back to attention by 
Friedman (1953). This theory says that the only determinants of  the inflation rate are the 
relative supply of  money and goods in the economy. Friedman also suggested a constant money
supply growth rule to help combat inflation.
Beginning roughly in the 1990s the world has experienced a noticeable drop in inflation 
rates among all countries. This caused the policymakers and academics to look for the cause of  
this change. Some speculated that the adoption of  the Taylor Rule, introduced in Taylor (1993),
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was the cause of  this drop in inflation around the world. Alesina and Summers (1993) believed 
it was the heterogeneity in central bank independence that could explain this sudden change.
Romer (1993) and Lane (1997) argued that increased openness of  the economy also increased 
the cost of  unexpected inflation and therefore reduced the temptation to engage in excessive 
money supply increases.  The famous Lucas (1976) critique of  backward looking economic 
models created a new paradigm in economic models of  inflation.
With the introduction of  forward-looking expectations money supply alone cannot be 
sufficient in explaining the inflation dynamics of  many countries. To this line of  thought 
Sargent and Wallace (1981) predicted that the ability of  the monetary policy to target inflation 
may only be effective with coordination with fiscal side of  economic policy. Sargent and Wallace
(1981) predicted that tight monetary policy could lead to a higher inflation rate under certain 
conditions.  With a given demand for government bonds and no changes in future fiscal policy 
some of  the debt has to be inflated away using seigniorage. 
Related to Sargent and Wallace (1981) is the Fiscal Theory of  the Price Level, which 
was developed by Leeper (1991), Sims (1994) and Woodford (1994). The Fiscal Theory of  the 
Price Level argues that an increase in government deficits has an effect on the price level. 
Empirical work in Catao (2005) showed a strong association between deficits and inflation 
among high inflation developing countries. 
Inflation plays a big role in the decision making function of  households, individuals and 
companies. One such example is the impact of  inflation in lowering real wages and reducing 
rigidity in wages of  labor markets. Wage rigidity was shown to be nominal in nature and only 
reduced by inflation. Nominal inflation was shows not to decrease even in times of  drought. 
Thus workers were unwilling to accept lower wages even in tough times. (Kaur 2012) 
Therefore inflation serves a very important function in reducing unemployment during 
recessions. Inflation was shows to “ grease the wheels” of  labor markets as predicted by Tobin 
(1972). One way through which inflation influences the decision making of  poor individuals 
could be the propagation effect of  price shocks in a specific product group. Propagation happens
when a price hike in one product group also affects the prices in other product groups. Pedersen
(2010) found that price shocks in food products resulted in higher propagation than price 
shocks in energy products, also emerging countries are more affected by propagation than 
advanced. 
Commodity price increases may not even lead to inflation in every case. In this seminal 
paper Mankiw (1985) set forth the model which looks at the effect of  “menu costs” on the 
pricing decisions of  firms based on an increase in underlying costs. “Menu cost” is the cost of  
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printing a new menu or the cost of  changing the price of  the firm’s product in every outlet. 
This cost has an effect on the firm’s decision to change the price of  its product based on the 
increase in underlying costs. Therefore firms may or may not shift the higher cost to consumers
based on the degree of  price increase. There is extensive literature in microeconomics that 
looks at the ways that companies shift the increasing costs of  raw commodities to the 
customers, which results in inflation. This argument was extended by Christiano et al. (2005) 
who looked at the impact of  expansionary monetary policy shock on marginal output. 
Christiano et al.(2005) determined that staggered wage contracts and variable capital utilization
impacted the degree to which inflation expectations were driving changes in real marginal 
costs. Rigobon (2010) used micro price data to test how much of  the underlying raw material 
cost increases was passed on to customers. Rigobon (2010) found that sectors responded 
differently across countries and commodities. Therefore different characteristics of  each sector 
have an impact on the pass through of  commodity price shocks. 
Exporting countries may be affected differently by a rise in underlying costs compared 
to net raw commodity importers. This may not be a simple case of  higher raw inputs leading to
higher inflation for every country. Zoli (2009) found that international commodity price shocks 
have a significant impact on domestic inflation, however the effect of  commodity price shocks 
was asymmetric to inflation in a panel of  18 European countries. Previous studies of  
commodity prices looked at the retail pass-through channel and assumed homogeneous effects 
on inflation and could not reach a consensus. Awokuse and Yang (2002), Cutler et
al.(2005) and Jumah and Kunst (2007) found that commodity prices do affect inflation while 
Blomberg and Harris (1995), and Furlong and Ingenito (1996) found that commodity prices do 
not affect inflation.
Previous work on commodity prices focused on growth rates Deaton (1999) and the 
Resource Curse Auty (1993). My approach also differs from existing literature on budget 
deficits and inflation (Elmendorf,1993; Catao and Terrones, 2005) by introducing 
heterogeneous effects of  commodity price shocks on inflation and budget deficits through the 
Export Index and the Import Index approach. The intuition behind this approach is that a rise 
in the price of  a certain commodity will only have an effect on the country's inflation rate if  the
country exports or imports that commodity. 
Using this approach I find that an increase in the Export Index leads to a decrease in 
the inflation rate, while an increase in the Import Index leads to an increase in the inflation rate.
The Export Index has a negative contemporary effect on the inflation rate through the Fiscal 
Balance channel. The Import Index has a positive effect on the inflation rate in the following 
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year through the retail pass-through channel. The effect of  the Export Index varies by the 
country's income group level and by the level of  inflation in the country. 
 Following  this  introduction,  Section  2  of  my  paper  presents  a  description  of  the
methodology and the econometrics model used in this paper. Section 3 describes the data used
in this paper. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1 Commodity Price Index
At the core of  my approach is the Commodity Price Index. In this paper I am following
the methodology first used by Deaton (1999). I construct a country specific commodity Export
and Import Price Index that captures exogenous shocks to commodity prices :
CommodityIndexi,t = ∏cϵC ComPricec,tθi,c
where ComPricec,t is the price of  commodity c in year t. θi,c is the average export or import 
weight assigned to each commodity. These weights are based on the time invariant value of  
exports or imports of  a commodity in the GDP of  the country i. This functional form of  the 
commodity price index follows common practice in the literature, for example Collier(2007). 
Using this approach I can create a unique index that captures the relative value of  Exports or 
Imports  to each country. This allows me to introduce heterogeneous effects to the underlying 
changes in global commodity prices by differentiating between the retail pass-through channel 
of  import commodity prices and the impact of  export commodity prices on the inflation rate. I 
used time invariant weights to get around the limitations of  the data and also to establish a 
unique profile of  a country that is based on the average amount of  a commodity 
exported/imported as a share of  GDP over 30 years. I created the index using local currency 
and US dollars to test if  the variation in the Index is coming from price changes in the 
underlying commodities or changes in the exchange rate. Following Deaton (1999) the 
commodities in question are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron, maize, oil, 
rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat and wood. 
2.2 Estimation Strategy
To examine heterogeneous effects of  commodity prices on inflation, I estimate the 
following econometric model where the within-country change in the log of  the Consumer 
Price Index (∆logCPIi,t) is related to the within-country change in the log of  the Export 
(∆logExportIndexi,t) and the Import Index (∆logImportIndexi,t):
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 ∆logCPIi,t=γ1∆ logCPIi,t-1+γ2 ∆logExportIndexi,t+γ3 ∆logExportIndexi,t-1 +γ4
∆logImportIndexi,t+γ5 ∆logImportIndexi,t-1 +γ6 ∆logManufacturedIndext +γ7∆
logManufacturedIndext-1 + γ8∆ logExchangeRatei,t + γ9∆ logM2i,t + γ10 ∆logM2i,t-1
+γ11∆logGDPGapi,t +αi +βt +  μ i,t
In the above equation the inflation rate of  a country is defined as the log change in CPI.  α
i are country fixed effects that capture time invariant country specific unobserved variables and 
βt are year fixed effects that capture common year shocks.  μ i,t is the error term clustered at the 
country level. I use the change of  the log of  the Export/Import Indexes to ensure that within-
country variations in the Export/Import Indexes are due to percentage changes in the local 
currency commodity prices. Manufactured Goods Index is a measurement of  the import price 
of  manufactured goods and is calculated in US dollars. GDP Gap , M2 , Exchange Rate , CPI 
and the Export/Import Indexes are calculated in local currency. 
In the baseline regression I estimate the average marginal effect of  commodity price
fluctuations on CPI inflation by using the largest possible sample size.  Later I  split  up the
sample by income groups and level of  inflation to test for heterogeneity in the marginal effects. 
3. Data:
Data on annual international commodity prices for the 1970-2009 period was obtained 
from UNCTAD Commodity Statistics (UNCTAD,2009). Data on the value of  Commodity 
Exports and Imports is from NBER-United Nations Trade Database (Feenstra et al., 2004). 
Commodities used in the index are aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron, 
maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat and wood. For some commodities multiple 
prices were listed, I used a simple average of  those prices. Data on the price of  iron was not 
available for 2010-2013 years, this reduced my sample time frame to 1970-2009. Additionally 
the data on commodity Exports/Imports had multiple entries for some commodities, only the 
category describing raw commodities was used. The methodology by Deaton (1999) called for 
using the average time invariant weights, this helped overcome some missing data problems in 
the value of  Exports/Imports database. NBER-United Nations Trade Database does not report
zero values, thus one cannot differentiate between missing values and 0 commodities 
Exported/Imported. Additionally I tested for changes in the export profile of  a country 
through time by creating an index based on export weights in the 1990s. The results were 
similar to the index using the average of  1970-2000 annual weights. Table 2 presents the 
country list and the sum of  Export weights for that country. Resource rich countries have 
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highest weights in the sample, while a developed country like the United States has weights 
close to 0. 
Macroeconomic data is mostly from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database
of  the IMF. Additionally data from World Bank's World Development Indicators was used. The
data set covers 142 countries and up to 38 annual observations per country. The definition of  
money supply is M2. Fiscal Balance data is from Catao (2005). Fiscal Balance data from the 
IMF only included deficit data from the central government and did not include state or local 
governments. Using more comprehensive data from Catao (2005) increased my Fiscal Balance 
observations from 1400 to 2800. 
4. Results: 
3.1  Main results
Table 3 shows the main results. In this table all variables are in log changes and local
currency, except for the Manufactured Goods index which is in US dollars. The coefficients on
the Manufactured Goods Index and the first lag of  the Manufactured Goods Index is positive
and significant at 1%. This suggests that an increase in the cost of  manufactured goods leads to
an increase in inflation. This finding is consistent with economic theory and expectations. The
coefficient on the Exchange Rate is positive and significant, this suggests that an increase in the
Exchange Rate  is  associated  with  an increase  in  the  inflation  rate.  This  is  consistent  with
economic theory and is significant with the addition of  other covariates. The changes in M2 is
correlated with an increase in the inflation rate in both contemporary and next years. This
result confirms the monetary theory of  the money supply as the main driver of  inflation. The
first lag of  the inflation rate is added to capture any possible omitted variables, this follows the
methodology of  Kwon (2008).
The coefficient on the log of  the Export Index is negative in the contemporary case and
is not significant in the first lag.  This suggests that an increase in the Export Commodity
Index  is  associated  with  a  reduction  in  the  inflation  rate  in  the  current  year.  This  result
suggests that the Price of  Exported Commodities affects inflation differently from the Price of
Imported Commodities. The coefficient is negative and significant at 1% level even with the
addition of  covariates. 
The coefficient on the log of  the Import Index is positive and significant in column 3 of
Table 3. The coefficient of  the first lag of  the Import Index is positive and significant at 5%
level. This result is consistent with the retail pass-through channel of  transmission of  Import
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Commodity Prices on inflation in a country. This result also confirms heterogeneous effect of
commodity prices on inflation based on the Export/Import profile of  that country. However
this result is not significant when the first lag of  the inflation rate is added in column 4 and 5.
The regressions in Table 3 have between 4011 and 3783 observations with the number of
countries ranging from 141 to 138. Country fixed effects and year fixed effects have been used
to test for country specific and year specific shocks to inflation. The high R-squared suggests
that the model is properly specified. Additionally the time trend was introduced to capture and
reduction in global inflation due to the time trend.
Table 4 uses the Export and Import Indexes in US dollar currency to test whether the
results in Table 3 come from changes in the underlying price of  the commodities or the change
in the relative Exchange Rates  of  each country.  The coefficients  on the  Export  Index are
similar and significant at 1% level. The different size of  the coefficient can be explained by the
different base of  the US Dollar and the Local Currency Indexes.  The coefficient on the Import
Index is significant only at the 10% level now, before the inclusion of  the first lag of  inflation. 
Table  5  breaks  down  the  sample  into  four  different  income  groups  based  on  the
classification by the World Bank. The local currency Export Index has a negative coefficient in
Lower Income , Middle Income and High Income OECD countries, but is not significant in the
High  Income  non  OECD  group.  This  suggests  that  Low  and  Middle  Income  countries
experienced reduction in their inflation rates when their Export Index increased. However this
effect disappears in the High Income non OECD case. This can be explained by the make of
countries  in  the  High  Income  non  OECD  group,  which  consists  mostly  of  wealthy  oil
exporting countries  in  the Middle East,  Russia  and are known for  their  weak institutional
quality. 
Table 7 breaks down the sample by their inflation rates. The results show that countries
with  highest  observed  inflation  rates  experience  the  largest  effects  of  Export  Index  on
inflation.  This  is  consistent  with  the  deficit  channel  of  mediation,  as  theory  suggests  that
countries that have large and chronic deficits experience high inflation. Countries that generally
have  low  levels  of  inflation  they  are  not  likely  to  be  affected  by  the  Export  Index.  The
coefficient of  the Export Index in column 4 and 5 differ greatly in size. This suggests that most
of  the result comes from countries that have large and chronic deficits, which improve their
Fiscal Balance by using commodity Export revenue. 
Table 6 shows that Fiscal Balance is the most likely channel of  mediation in the Export
Index case. Fiscal Balance is defined as Deficits/Surplus as a share of  GDP in local currency. I
assume that Export Commodity Prices are exogenous for most countries in the sample, as small
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countries that export raw commodities do not have enough market power to influence the price
of  a commodity. Figure 1 shows a diagram of  the Fiscal Balance channel and explains how an
exogenous change in the price of  an export commodity can lead to an increase in the Fiscal
Balance of  a country. An improvement in the Fiscal Balance of  a country then reduces inflation
as shown by Catao (2005).  Column 1 of  Table 6 shows that an improvement in the Fiscal
Balance leads to a reduction in the inflation rate in the current year. Column 2 of  Table 6 shows
that an exogenous increase in the Export Index leads to an improvement in the Fiscal Balance.
Using methodology by Imai  (2011)  in American Political  Science  Review  the Average Causal
Mediating  Effect  (ACME)  was  calculated  using  the  coefficient  multiplication  approach.
Assuming Sequential  Ignorability  and No-Interaction assumptions  ACME is  asymptotically
consistent and equal to -0.02. Figure 2 shows that ACME is negative and significant at the ρ=0.
Sequential Ignorability is a valid assumption in the Fiscal Balance channel as all arrows point
outward from the Fiscal Balance except for the Export Index. 
5. Summary and Conclusions
Commodity prices were shown to have heterogeneous effects on inflation rates based on
the Export and Import profile of  each country. Countries that experience an increase in their
Export  Index  were  shown  to  experience  a  decrease  in  their  inflation  rate.  Countries  that
experienced an increase in their Import Index last year were shown to experience an increase in
their inflation rate current year. This confirms the retail pass-through channel for the import
case.  For  the  export  case  Fiscal  Balance  was  shown  to  have  a  negative  Average  Causal
Mediating  Effect  on  inflation.  The  effect  of  the  Export  Index  on  inflation  varies  by  the
country's income level , institutional quality and the overall level of  inflation. 
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Figure 1: Exports Affect Inflation Through the Fiscal Balance Channel
  Figure 2: Average Causal Mediating Effect Sensitivity Test
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Variable Observations Currency Mean Min Max
Economic Variables:
Inflation 4446 Local Currency 0.1446619 0.3255697 -0.1940755 5.475339
5398 Local Currency 0.0144078 0.0934506 -1.963419 3.100665
5398 US Dollars 0.0053202 0.045106 -0.3999 0.7624545
5363 Local Currency 0.0044073 0.0351747 -0.6074882 1.328035
5398 US Dollars 0.0025645 0.0335677 -0.6074882 1.276211
5559 US Dollars 3.817188 6.566289 -6.202695 21.86495
5398 Local Currency 0.0999363 0.402206 -6.907711 8.83407
Log M2 4725 Local Currency 0.2012442 0.331344 -6.173557 4.837324
GDP Gap 2541 Local Currency -2.974909 2.747968 -12.16874 3.659877
Fiscal Balance /GDP 2878 Local Currency -3.733362 4.871619 -41.2208 18.2693
Commodity Prices:
Aluminum 5559 US Dollars 1433.646 519.1424 589.6083 2637.799
Beef 5559 US Dollars 98.44349 19.72729 59.16167 130.9417
Cocoa 5559 US Dollars 78.12024 32.62162 24.43 171.8567
Coffee 5559 US Dollars 100.094 42.43009 43.63083 229.2125
Copper 5559 US Dollars 2375.438 1502.586 1070.592 7117.229
Cotton 5559 US Dollars 132.7523 32.11618 28.7208 205.335
Oil 5559 US Dollars 25.4639 19.49223 2.11 97.01667
Gold 5559 US Dollars 357.4106 193.1355 35.93833 973.0044
Iron 5559 US Dollars 33.47179 23.83855 9.84 134.41
Wood 5559 US Dollars 546.3029 253.2249 123.2994 998.4103
Rice 5559 US Dollars 304.055 113.987 129 700.1667
Rubber 5559 US Dollars 1028.991 480.7345 332.4677 2618.299
Sugar 5559 US Dollars 10.66829 5.446826 3.674167 29.70167
Tobacco 5559 US Dollars 2660.281 714.8834 1055.333 4235.284
Wheat 5559 US Dollars 153.4065 50.05078 54.84167 343.2042
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Standard 
Deviation
Log Export Index
Log Export Index
Log Import Index
Log Import Index
Log Manufactured Goods Index
Log Exchange Rate
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Country Country Country Country
Oman 0.6 Syria 0.111 Azerbaijan 0.038 Lithuania 0.007
Qatar 0.587 Ghana 0.111 Sudan 0.036 Poland 0.007
Angola 0.475 Uganda 0.111 Australia 0.034 Bahamas 0.006
Guyana 0.454 Papua N.Guin 0.11 Mexico 0.034 Malta 0.006
Kuwait 0.446 Ecuador 0.089 Ireland 0.033 Hungary 0.006
Saudi Arabia 0.445 Guatemala 0.086 Ethiopia 0.029 India 0.005
Nigeria 0.369 Seychelles 0.085 Malawi 0.023 Gambia 0.005
Suriname 0.356 Tajikistan 0.084 New Zealand 0.023 Finland 0.005
Iraq 0.345 Honduras 0.084 Philippines 0.023 Croatia 0.005
Congo 0.342 Egypt 0.084 Pakistan 0.022 Slovenia 0.005
Gabon 0.342 Costa Rica 0.081 Burkina Faso 0.022 Senegal 0.004
St.Kt-Nev-An 0.288 Togo 0.08 Bolivia 0.021 Romania 0.004
Zambia 0.284 Burundi 0.078 Cambodia 0.021 Mongolia 0.004
Untd Arab Em 0.28 Norway 0.074 Brazil 0.02 Israel 0.004
Liberia 0.27 Viet Nam 0.072 Ukraine 0.02 Switz.Liecht 0.004
Libya 0.267 Dominican Rp 0.071 Canada 0.02 Albania 0.004
Yemen 0.259 GuineaBissau 0.07 Zimbabwe 0.019 Nepal 0.004
Eq.Guinea 0.239 Colombia 0.068 Kyrgyzstan 0.019 Czech Rep 0.003
Iran 0.231 Chad 0.061 Sri Lanka 0.019 Djibouti 0.003
Cote Divoire 0.194 Cent.Afr.Rep 0.057 Estonia 0.018 Jordan 0.003
Guinea 0.164 Mali 0.053 Panama 0.017 Sweden 0.003
Mauritius 0.161 Sierra Leone 0.051 Niger 0.016 Bosnia Herzg 0.003
Belize 0.155 Benin 0.051 Bahrain 0.016 Korea Rep. 0.003
Kazakhstan 0.145 Latvia 0.05 Mozambique 0.015 Slovakia 0.003
Trinidad Tbg 0.144 Paraguay 0.05 South Africa 0.014 Armenia 0.003
Cameroon 0.144 Singapore 0.048 Netherlands 0.014 Belarus 0.002
Malaysia 0.143 Rwanda 0.048 UK 0.014 USA 0.002
Venezuela 0.141 Kenya 0.046 Bulgaria 0.013 Cyprus 0.002
Algeria 0.14 Thailand 0.046 Samoa 0.012 Italy 0.001
Fiji 0.131 Tunisia 0.044 Argentina 0.011 Morocco 0.001
Jamaica 0.13 Peru 0.043 Georgia 0.011 Lebanon 0
El Salvador 0.121 Madagascar 0.043 China 0.009 Iceland 0
Nicaragua 0.119 Barbados 0.043 Denmark 0.009 Japan 0
Indonesia 0.117 Russian Fed 0.042 Lao P.Dem.R 0.008 Bangladesh 0
Dem.Rp.Congo 0.115 Tanzania 0.04 Turkey 0.008
Mauritania 0.111 Uruguay 0.04 Haiti 0.007
Table 2: List of Countries in the Sample and a measure of Commodity Exports/GDP ratio.
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Local Currency Index
---OLS Estimates, Clustered Standard Errors---
Dependent Variable: Inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports
-0.460*** -0.486*** -0.486*** -0.476*** -0.476***
(0.0959) (0.103) (0.103) (0.106) (0.106)
0.0202 0.0328 0.0328 -0.0179 -0.0179
(0.0597) (0.0623) (0.0623) (0.0702) (0.0702)
Imports
-0.0336 -0.0409 -0.0409 -0.0469 -0.0469
(0.0453) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0450) (0.0450)
0.0859** 0.0807** 0.0807** 0.0237 0.0237
(0.0409) (0.0401) (0.0401) (0.0396) (0.0396)
0.0155*** 0.0133** 0.00841*** 0.0161*** 0.00875***
(0.00226) (0.00543) (0.00130) (0.00558) (0.00133)
0.0746*** 0.054 0.0116*** 0.0749* 0.0109***
(0.0128) (0.0386) (0.00218) (0.0392) (0.00210)
0.489*** 0.496*** 0.496*** 0.482*** 0.482***
(0.0328) (0.0338) (0.0338) (0.0358) (0.0358)
0.306*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 0.293*** 0.293***
(0.0288) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0310) (0.0310)
0.216*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.125*** 0.125***
(0.0227) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0193) (0.0193)
GDP Gap -0.00818 -0.00818 -0.00121 -0.00121
(0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Trend 0.000943 0.00142
(0.000866) (0.000883)
Inflation, t-1 0.132*** 0.132***
(0.0341) (0.0341)
Constant -0.540*** -0.419* -0.159*** -0.539** -0.146***
(0.0903) (0.239) (0.0236) (0.243) (0.0227)
Observations 4011 3818 3818 3783 3783
Number of Countries 141 140 140 138 138
R-squared 0.898 0.901 0.901 0.906 0.906
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3. Effect of Commodity Price Shocks on Inflation
Δ Log Export Index
Δ Log Export Index, t-1
Δ Log Import Index
Δ Log Import Index, t-1
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index, t-1
Δ Log Exchange Rate
Δ Log M2
Δ Log M2, t-1
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Table 6. Fiscal Balance Channel of Mediation 
Local Currency Index
---OLS Estimates, Clustered Standard Errors---
Dependent Variable: Inflation Dependent Variable: Fiscal Balance
(1) (2)
Exports
-0.566** 11.78***
(0.266) (3.171)
-0.16
(0.115)
Imports
-0.05
(0.0374)
0.00474
(0.0339)
0.0144**
(0.00656)
-0.00109
(0.00313)
-0.00201**
(0.000815)
0.508*** -3.214***
(0.0388) (0.570)
0.331***
(0.0435)
0.120***
(0.0249)
GDP Gap -0.00543
(0.00689)
Trend 0.00485*
(0.00277)
Inflation, t-1 0.101**
(0.0398)
Constant -0.155** -3.192***
(0.0778) (0.563)
Observations 2087 2801
Number of Countries 84 96
R-squared 0.939 0.418
Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Δ Log Export Index
Δ Log Export Index, t-1
Δ Log Import Index
Δ Log Import Index, t-1
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index
Δ Log Manufactured Goods Index, t-1
Δ Fiscal Balance
Δ Log Exchange Rate
Δ Log M2
Δ Log M2, t-1
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Local Currency Index
---OLS Estimates, Clustered Standard Errors---
Dependent Variable: Inflation
Low High
(1) (2)
Exports
0.0214 -0.673***
(0.0280) (0.129)
0.0555 0.0293
(0.0347) (0.0878)
Imports
0.0183 -0.502
(0.0168) (0.612)
0.00676 -0.0894
(0.0176) (0.469)
Observations 1830 1953
Number of Countries 65 73
Average Inflation Level Low High
R-squared 0.586 0.915
Country FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7. Effect of Commodity Price Shocks on Inflation
Δ Log Export Index
Δ Log Export Index, t-1
Δ Log Import Index
Δ Log Import Index, t-1
Appendix
My study looks at the impact of  commodity prices changes on the inflation rates of  a
panel of  140 countries. This Appendix focuses on a single country, Chile, and for this reason is
qualitative  in  nature.  This  case  study  will  focus  on  the  two  driving  narratives  of  Chile's
economic history in the last 40 years, “super cycle” in the price of  copper and elite capture.
Chile has been the exception to the global failure of  “neoliberal” economic policies around the
world.  This  exceptionalism  was  shaped  by  limited  political  diversity,  protection  of  the
“neoliberal” model from criticism at the cost of  equality and individual rights. These policies
contributed to Chile's high per capita income growth in the past 40 years. The 2008 financial
crisis and the perceived failure of  laissez-faire financial reforms in the United States, the cradle
of  neoliberal policies, shook the public's faith in “free market” capitalism domestically and also
globally. This was the impetus for a host of  social movements in Chile aimed to challenge the
past neoliberal policies. 
A.1  Introduction to Chile
Chile is located in South America and stretches along the western coast of  the continent
from Peru to the southernmost tip of  South America. Chile is a mountainous country with 
large supplies of  natural-resources and natural ports on its western coast that enabled its 
colonization by European settlers. The most abundant natural-resource of  Chile are its copper 
reserves, that are mostly located in the northern Atacama Desert. A second notable resource of
Chile is wine that is grown in the Central Valley of  Chile, located in the middle of  the country. 
The capital of  the country is Santiago and is located in the Central Valley of  Chile. The
residents are segregated into wealthy and poor neighborhoods with a glittering downtown 
featuring many shiny skyscrapers. Chile also ranks highly on many indexes used to measure a 
country's progress, like per capita GDP and the “ease of  doing business”. In 2010 Chile became
a member of  the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This 
ascension of  a largely developing country into an exclusive club of  wealthy countries is odd 
considering the stark level of  inequality and political restriction that still exist in Chile. All 
these perceived signals of  progress are hiding the pervasive inequality in the country. The view
from those skyscrapers overlooks poverty, the per capita GDP is driven mostly by the high 
income elite, and the “ease of  doing business” does not look at the welfare of  the workers. 
While the official poverty rate is 15%, it relies on an outdated survey and a recent study by 
Larrain (2008) finds that the true poverty rate is roughly double the official rate. It is unlikely 
that the government will update its survey 
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Copper exports play a huge role in Chile, accounting for half  of  all exports in 2010.  
The copper export sector is dominated by international firms which pay royalty and taxes on 
their earnings. The state copper exporter CODELCO was downsized as part of  the neoliberal 
policy of  privatization. This means that majority of  the profits from copper exports accrue to 
foreign firms. The copper export sector does not create any jobs downstream from it, because it
is a raw commodity exporter. Most of  the supplies for the copper export sector are provided by
foreign firms and mostly comprise machinery. The sustainability of  this finite natural resource 
exporting strategy is questionable. For this reason Chile ranks poorly in most indexes that 
cover Environmental Sustainability. 
The modern Chilean political narrative begins with the election of  Eduardo Frei 
Montalva of  the “Christian Democrats” in 1964. This centrist candidate started policies to 
nationalize the mostly United States owned copper companies, agrarian reform and overall 
progressive social policies. During this time all of  South America was under the influence of  
socialist rhetoric from the Soviet Union and this mobilized the peasants, urban residents , 
students and labor activists to create the alliance of  socialists, Unidad Popular. Their candidate 
in the 1970 election was Salvador Allende. Upon election Allende embarked on a policy of  
“Chilean socialism” aimed to nationalize large industry and especially the copper industry.  
Allende's policy of  nationalism and fiscal expansion was financed by seigniorage and resulted 
in high inflation. These movements were perceived by the United States government and 
wealthy Chileans as paving the way for a socialist country. With the country embargoed by the 
United States and dissatisfaction with the new policies high at home, Chile was prime for a coup
to swing the pendulum to the other extreme of  the political spectrum. 
Pinochet was the chief  of  the armed forces when he overthrew Allende on September 
11 1973. Acting on a perceived Soviet threat to Chile , Pinochet enacted a policy of  brutal 
crackdown on any forms of  dissent to his rule. Scores of  opposition activists were abducted 
and murdered by the Chilean military and secret police. 
To implement economic reform Pinochet turned to the United States and the University
of  Chicago in particular. 25 Chilean nationals trained at the University of  Chicago were 
recruited into key government positions. They implemented the newly developed neoliberal 
ideas of  macroeconomic discipline, abolition of  price controls and deregulating markets and 
industry. These reforms lowered the inflation rate and increased the GDP growth rate of  the 
economy. Inflation rate went from 340% in 1975 to 9% in 1981.  In 1982 Chile had developed 
large Current Account deficits and experienced a financial crisis. This resulted in a drop in 
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aggregate consumption and aggregate investment. The 1982 financial crisis and the ensuing 
recession combined to decrease real wages , increase poverty and unemployment in the country.
The government's reaction was to drop the fixed exchange rate of  the Chilean peso versus the 
US dollar on recommendation from Milton Friedman. This increased the public debt of  the 
country overnight and negatively affected companies that borrowed in US dollars. The overall 
cost to the Chilean government of  the 1982 financial crisis was roughly 40% of  the GDP.
For his sins Pinochet was never indicted or jailed. He was placed under house arrest in 
1998 on a visit to the United Kingdom. Later Pinochet was extradited back to Chile where was 
intermittently under house arrest but was not indicted for any crimes during his presidency. 
Aside from being inconvenienced Pinochet escaped justice and died in 2006 a free man. The 
decision not to charge Pinochet in Chile for his crimes illustrates the power of  Pinochet's 
powerbase and the complicity of  those currently in power in the same crimes. 
In the 1988 a referendum was called to decide whether Pinochet could serve another 8 
year term as president. Upon Pinochet's defeat Chile was now on a path to democracy. The first
freely elected president was Patricio Aylwin from the Christian Democrat party. The transition
from military dictatorship to democracy rested on the guarantee that neoliberal economic 
policy would be sustained and those responsible for the crackdown and repression would not be
prosecuted. The new government however did increase the minimum wage, public expenditure 
on services and infrastructure. Aylwin administration can be described as relatively left leaning.
The following cycle Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle of  the Christian Democrats was elected 
president in 1993. The Frei administration can be described as relatively right leaning. Frei 
embarked on a policy of  privatization of  the water sector and further integration of  Chile into 
the world economy. Chile entered the World Trade Organization, Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Group, MERCOSUR and signed free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico. 
In 2000 a nominally socialist Ricardo Lagos won the presidency. His policies were 
largely neoliberal, with the exception of  public health care reform aimed at lower class people. 
In 2006 Lagos was succeeded by Michelle Bachelet of  the Socialist Party. Although a socialist 
who was jailed in the 1970s for her political activism, Bachelet embarked on similar neoliberal 
economic policy as her predecessors. Her biggest contribution to social welfare in Chile was her
reform of  the social security system to expand eligibility. 
The constitution of  Chile was created in 1980 under the military dictatorship and thus 
restricts the amount of  influence the voters have on the legislature and the overall direction of  
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the country. The practice of  appointed senators was nominally eliminated by constitutional 
reforms in 2005, however the practice exists in practice. This is another example of  the long 
reach of  the Pinochet regime on the future of  Chile. 
A.2  Macroeconomy of  Chile
Figure 4.1 from Solimano(2012) shows the GDP and the per capita GDP for Chile.
Notable changes in the trend are the coup of  1973, financial crisis of  1982 and the “Chilean
miracle” which started in 1985 and resulted in a sharp increase in the GDP growth rate. The
high growth rate was interrupted by the Asian Financial crisis of  1997 and more recently by
the Global Financial crisis of  2008. 
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Table 4.1 from Solimano(2012) lists the key macroeconomic variables on Chile. Notably the
Terms  of  Trade  and  inflation  variables  offer  evidence  for  my  main  thesis  that  Export
Commodity Price Increases result in a decrease in CPI inflation. For Chile in the 1986-1997
period the Terms of  Trade was 98.4 with the inflation rate of  14.5% and in the 1998-2009
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period the Terms of  Trade was 143.2 with inflation rate of  3.4%. In the case of  Chile an
increase in the price of  copper resulted in a reduction in domestic CPI inflation. 
The  accelerated  growth  in  GDP  of  Chile  was  driven  by  political  stability  and  an
increased integration to global markets through free trade agreements. This sharp increase in
per capita GDP did not translate fully into an improvement for the poor.  Overall the Chilean
Macroeconomy was guided by the “Washington Consensus”. Taxes of  capital inflows, managed
exchange rates and reduction in inflation were practiced ever since the Pinochet regime took
power. Near the end of  the Pinochet regime the central bank of  Chile was established with
protections from political pressure and the mandate to maintain low inflation. The managed
exchange rate mechanism was dropped for a flexible exchange rate mechanism in 1999. The
Concertacion governments of  pre 2000s focused mainly on economic growth at the expense of
income  equality  and  the  environment.  The  more  socialist  government  from  2000  onward
engaged in a policy of  Fiscal Surpluses, Bachelet especially set up a fund in 2006 to capture
surpluses from copper exports with the aim of  engaging in counter cyclical fiscal spending.
This  fund was  used by Bachelet  to  fund public  welfare spending,  like  assistance to  middle
income house buyers. Following Table 4.5 From Solimano (2012) shows the different changes
in Fiscal and Monetary policy of  Chile. 
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Chile  adopted  a  policy  of  non-intervention  in  the  exchange  rates  and  thus  has
experienced higher  variation in  the  nominal  exchange rates  in  the 2000-2009 period.  This
increased  volatility  in  exchange  rates  ,  not  focusing  on  unemployment  are  some  of  the
drawbacks of  the Chilean approach to monetary policy with the sole goal of  inflation targeting.
A.3  Inequality and Poverty
The Gini coefficient for Chile has been above 50 and constant through the last 20 years.
Transition back to democracy, increases in GDP and per capita GDP did not affect the Gini
coefficient and the underlying inequality in Chile. The constitution crafted under Pinochet and
general low levels of  empowerment reduce the amount of  influence ordinary people have on
public policy. This results in a lack of  social services like public pensions, healthcare and good
schooling. 
Transition back to  democracy and the  election of  nominal  socialist  leaders  did not
result in any effects to implement redistribution. The topic of  wealth redistribution may still be
contentious in Chile and thus the successive governments decided instead to focus on poverty
reduction, instead of  tackling the underlying causes of  inequality. 
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Table 5.1 from Solimano (2012) shows the reduction in poverty and acute poverty in
Chile. The recent economic prosperity and social programs targeted at the poor were successful
in lowering the overall and the acute rates of  poverty. These numbers are uplifting, however
the methodology for calculating the official poverty rate was questioned by Larrain (2008).
Additionally getting out of  poverty is not permanent for all households in Chile. Lopez (2008)
showed that a large part of  the population is only slightly above the poverty line and any large
exogenous shock can drive those households back into poverty. Chile is known for earthquakes
that can wreak large scale damage even in the most adapted cities. The lack of  a robust social
net will mean that a large share of  the population could fall into poverty in the case of  a large
earthquake. 
The top  10% of  Chile's  population  captured  40% of  its  income in  2009,  while  the
bottom 20% captured only 3.6% of  the total income.  For this reason Chile ranks very high in
the Gini coefficient among its South American neighbors. Acemoglu (2012) illustrated how an
elite capture of  a country will result in lower institutional quality and then to a reduction in
the country GDP and other measurements of  prosperity. The case of  Chile however provides
anecdotal  evidence  of  the  opposite.  High  and persistent  inequality,  combined  with  a  large
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reduction in institutional quality stemming from the Pinochet coup and repression should have
resulted in a basketcase country. In the case of  Chile both of  those thing did not stop the
country  from  growing  and  eventually  joining  OECD.  It  is  possible  that  elite  capture  of
resources and the deterioration in institutional quality happens over many decades and the past
20 years of  democracy in Chile is not a long enough time horizon to see any significant effects.
The problem of  inequality is compounded by a very regressive tax system that heavily favors
the rich over the poor and middle income citizens. The following Table 4 from Lopez(2007)
provides an overview of  the skewed tax system that provides 81% of  tax loopholes to the top
5% of  the income distribution.
The  social  compact  in  Chile  promised  high  economic  growth  and  targeted  social
programs  for  the  poor  in  exchange  for  persistent  high  inequality.  Pre  1970s  the  aim  of
economic  development  in  Chile  was  social  modernization  and  general  industrialization.  To
achieve  this  aim  public  education,  urban  housing  and  public  health  infrastructure  were
emphasized. After the Pinochet coup the development goals of  Chile were changed to closely
follow  the  Washington  Consensus.  The  goal  of  development  was  shifted  from  reducing
inequality to reducing poverty. Privatization in all aspects of  economic life was mandated.
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Lagos and her successor Bachelet set out to change the goal of  economic development
in Chile by focusing on increasing social protection. The first aspect was reform of  the anti
poverty  program Chile  Solidario.  This  program provided  cash  assistance  to  some 300,000
families and also worked with those families to meet certain conditions over a two year period. 
The  education  law  implemented  by  the  Pinochet  regime  was  called  Ley  Organica
Constitucional de Educacion (LOCE). The aim of  that law was to privatize the educational
system in Chile as much as possible. This resulted in a two tiered system with underfunded
public  schools  for  the poor  and middle  income people and a private school  system for  the
wealthy.  This resulted in university students being responsible for upto 80% of  their tuition
and fees. Student unions like Federacion de Estudiantes de Chile and Federacion de Estudiantes
de la Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile protested this segregated system of  education.
Such a tiered system helps maintain the high inequality in Chile by denying poor and middle
income students the opportunity for upward mobility through educational achievement. Efforts
to reform this system were met with pushback from neoliberal forces in Chile, as the voucher
system used in LOCE was the brain child of  Milton Friedman. This voucher system split the
educational system into three parts. Public schools, voucher subsidized schools and fully private
schools. 
Following massive student strikes in 2006 and 2011 president Bachelet introduced new
laws governing education in Chile. Her reforms did not address the core stratification of  the
education system, but merely provided larger educational subsidies for low income and middle
income households. The new subsidy covers preschool and primary school fees. 
The Pinochet regime introduced privatization into the healthcare sector by dividing it
into public and private parts. The public part, FONASA, insured access to healthcare for all.
The poor  people do not pay for their  treatment in  FONASA facilities.  FONASA system is
characterized  by  long  waiting  lines  and  under  funded  facilities.  The  private  part  is  called
ISAPRES and the fees for treatment are calculated based on the recipient's income. Healthcare
sector underwent reform under the socialist governments of  Lagos and Bachelet. The goal of
this  reform ,  titled  AUGE,  was  to  increase  preventative  treatment  and  increase  access  to
treatment for lower and middle income Chileans. The military in Chile has its own health care
service. 
Another  important  social  net  that  was  destroyed  by  the  Pinochet  regime  was  the
Chilean  Pension  system.  The  pension  system  was  privatized  with  reliance  on  voluntary
contributions as the main source of  funding for each person's retirement. This arrangement
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favored people in high paying white collar jobs over the majority of  Chileans employed in small
and medium businesses. The individual has to make at least 20 years of  contributions to receive
a minimum pension under this system. The privatized retirement system did contribute to the
development of  financial markets in Chile. Bachelet introduced reform that gave persons age 65
and over supplementary pension if  they met certain criteria. This was done to help the poor
people that do not receive a pension. Once again the military is exempt from the private pension
system. 
Since the restoration of  Democracy ,  the military has enjoyed a privileged status in
Chile. The command in chief  of  the Chilean army is not accountable to the civilian oversight.
The military used to receive a set 10% of  the revenues from the state owned copper company,
CODELCO. This arrangement ended in 2009. Now the military is budgeted a nominal sum.
This was done at the request of  the military, because it wanted a stable source of  revenue for
its funding.  
The Chilean experience of  political instability is common in South America. Argentina
has experienced repeated cycles of  political turmoil from 1960 all the way up to 1990. Ecuador
has  experienced  instability  from  1960  to  1980.  The  Dominican  Republic  has  experienced
instability in the 1960s. 
Chile  ranks  high  in  common measurements  of  good  governance  as  defined  by  the
World Bank. On the measurements of  Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, Government
Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of  Law and Control of  Corruption Chile ranks much
higher than its South American neighbors. For this reason Foreign Direct Investment has been
an important part of  copper mining sector's development in Chile.  More recently FDI has
flown into a variety of  South American countries.  Most  of  that  investment has  been  into
petroleum, natural gas and mineral production. In Chile Chinese FDI has been directed solely
at the copper mining center.(Barton, 2009)  Neoliberal reforms guaranteed private property
rights and made Chile a relatively safer place for FDI than Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.
(Hogenboom, 2010; Kirby, 2010)
Dézalay and Garth (2002) found that the “technocrat' class in Chile played a key role in
the democratization process. This “technocrat” class is made up of  the elite with high academic
and professional achievement. According to Silva (1991, 2008) the “technocrat” class maintains
strong influence on the public through Think Tanks. For this reason the stratified educational
system and non-elected  senators  are the main mechanisms that  the elites  in  Chile  have to
maintain their position. 
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Chile has very low rate of  investment into Research and Development.  On average
Chile spends about 0.5% of  its GDP on R&D while other countries like Korea spend 2.6%, and
Ireland spends 2.6%. The private sector in Chile does not contribute enough to Research and
Development compared to other countries. In Sweden the private sector contributed 70% of  all
R&D, while in Chile the figure is only 26%. (Gregorio, 2005)
A.4  Copper Exports and Inflation in Chile
The main findings of  my paper are confirmed in the case of  Chile. An increase in the
price of  copper leads to a decrease in inflation. The following figure from Desormeaux(2009)
shows that positive terms of  trade shocks in Chile are negatively correlated with the inflation
rate.
My  analysis  looks  at  the  impact  of  raw  commodity  exports.  Terms  of  trade  is
calculated by looking the price of  exported goods as a ratio of  imported goods. In the case of
Chile, copper represents 50% of  the exported goods, thus the terms of  trade closely resembles
my analysis of  the Commodity Price Index. From the previous figure one can see that the rise
in copper prices from 2003 to 2005 resulted in a reduction of  the inflation rate from 5% to 0%.
While a reduction in the price of  copper from 2006 to 2009 resulted in an increase in CPI
inflation during the same period. 
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Desormeaux(2009)  models  both  pro-cyclical  and  counter-cyclical  fiscal  policy.  The
following findings from Desormeaux(2009) suggest that Chile is engaged in counter-cyclical
fiscal policy.
A.4  Conclusion
Chile is an example of  a middle income trap, where a country develops rapidly using
commodity exports and then fails to transition to a fully developed economy. There are pockets
of  promise  such  as  Chile's  integration  into  the  global  economy,  well  developed  financial
markets  at  home  and  good  governance  as  measured  by  the  World  Bank.  However  to
successfully transition from a largely resource driven economy to a modern developed economy
several crucial changes must be made to areas of  inequality, education and political inclusion.
The biggest hindrance to this process is the stratified educational system. The stranglehold of
the neoliberal elite on the economy and political discussion in Chile hinders any significant
change in course. The fundamentalist neoliberal policies and the fear of  straying from their
prescribed  path  stifles  discourse  on  important  issues  of  social  safety  nets,  equality  of
opportunity and public infrastructure investment. Heavy reliance on a single raw commodity
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exporting industry does not foster job growth or technological transfer to other sectors of  the
economy. Learning to dig holes in the ground does not spur development of  a manufacturing
sector. Neoliberal fundamentalism also prohibits public investment into needed infrastructure,
both physical and educational. 
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